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Introduction
Paths to Fiscal Transparency: Control, Knowledge and
Communication in Early-Modern Polities
Paradoxically, it is at a time when transparency is hailed as a key to
good governance and economic efýciency, and when national states and
transnational agencies are implementing new laws to allow citizens broad-
er access to information, that a series of crises and scandals, sometimes
revealed by whistle-blowers, have revealed the extent to which use of the
concept can be problematic and, perhaps, even fraught. Before the global
ýnancial crisis of 2008, academic literature had already started questioning
the rationale behind the adoption of the word ‘transparency’ by the world
of corporate ýnance. In the wake of freedom of information acts, various
authors had also started to reýne analytical approaches in order to examine
what was at stake behind the rapid spread of the concept.1
In the aftermath of the global ýnancial crisis of 2008, which has
shaken the banking sector and rocked citizens conýdence in institutions,
interest in transparency has grown substantially. Since Jeremy Bentham’s
ýrst introduction of the word into the language in 1789, few societal debates
have sparked so much concern across a variety of disciplines, beyond the
traditional remit of economics and politics, and using new approaches and
methodologies. As the debate is still developing, it is too early to identify
major new directions or draw preliminary conclusions. It is likely, however,
that the current developments in critical analysis and reappraisals of the
concept of transparency — and others like accountability, openness or pri-
vacy — will be instrumental in providing an effective response to the new
1. See for instance J. BEST, 2005; C.HOOD&D.HEALD, 2006; R. M. BUSHMAN, J. D. PIOTROSKI
&A. J. SMITH, 2004.
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challenges brought about by globalisation and pave the way to a more robust
relationship between nations, markets and citizens.2
One striking fact has emerged from the current debates: the lack of
historical reþection about the development of the concept of transparen-
cy, both as a principle and as a practice.3 True, the example of the French
Revolution of 1789, which saw a so-called absolute monarchy transformed
overnight into a fully-þedged constitutional regime, with public political de-
bates, parliamentary commissions and published reports, and a declaration
of the rights of the man that introduced the principle of national sovereignty,
government accountability and freedom of expression, may give the impres-
sion that the transition from Ancien Régime to the Modern World was very
simple, and that the experience was easily transferable to other countries. In
this respect, implementation of efýcient and sustainable modern institutions
does not appear to be the product of speciýc historical experiences. Rather,
at a level of development, or under certain circumstances, it would seem
the inevitable outcome of a conþict-in-waiting between a ruler and self-per-
petuating elites, and the people, and which could be solved by applying an
available roadmap. In both cases, the question remains whether the origins
of societal and political change among European polities were endogenous
or exogenous, or, as seems more plausible, a mix of both.
Neo-institutionalist literature, with its emphasis on the Glorious Revo-
lution, has highlighted the role of politics in the development of efýcient in-
stitutions conducive to efýcient ýnancial markets and economic growth. In
the last two decades, however, the trend has been to challenge this ‘big-bang
theory’. Historians have emphasized the extent to which the English expe-
rience was essentially exceptional and, to an extent, the results of fortuitous
events.4 New research on the Fiscal-Military state has suggested that poli-
ties across Europe were confronted by with problems of a similar nature.5
In the case of England, new work has also demonstrated that the success of
the political, ýscal and religious settlement of 1688 was dependent on prior
changes that had already occurred during the English Civil Wars.6
2. The number of articles published on transparency is growing fast. For this introduction we
did not conduct a full review of new work as they are not all fully relevant to our purpose which
is mainly historical.
3. See, however, T. C. IRWIN, 2013; S. BAUME, 2015.
4. P. O’BRIEN, 2011.
5. R. TORRES SÁNCHEZ, 2007, 2015.
6. D. COFFMAN, 2013.
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In other words, if various models of institutions or agencies did ex-
ist and circulated in early-modern Europe, unlike goods they could not
or would not be simply exported and adopted by polities. While Jacques
Necker sought to emulate the English model of government he admired so
much, especially the link between publishing of accounts and public credit,
most revolutionaries remained deeply critical of the British constitution. For
Britain had recently had experienced military defeat, was seriously in debt
and exposed to radical criticism at home. The French sought to establish a
universal model of society and government, which the Revolutionary and
Napoleonic armies soon imposed upon the monarchies they toppled. While
it has been argued that the political modernisation of nineteenth-century
Europe was a consequence of exogenous factors, one can also observe that
if the seed for future developments was planted, the transition to Modernity
was far from linear, and the path to transparency a bumpy one, and may not
be over yet.7
Accordingly, the aim of this special issue of Histoire & Mesure is to
contribute to historicising the concept of transparency. Long before Ben-
tham coined the term ‘transparency’ in his Introduction to the principles
of morals and legislation (1789), Old Regime states and agencies encoun-
tered problems of governance and institutional efýciency. In the context of
the international warfare which was characteristic of the long eighteenth
century, the rise of the Fiscal-Military state and the emergence of indebt-
edness generated deep anxieties about the stability of existing polities and
sustainability of economic systems. In response to the ýscal demands of
their respective Leviathans, the subjects of European monarchies called on
the concept of light — in the form of the Enlightenment, les Lumières, die
Aufklärung, l’Illuminismo, etc. — to dissipate the veil of darkness which
hid government policy from scrutiny, in order to check corruption, ýght
inequality and promote growth.
The articles published in this special issue proceed from a workshop
which took place at the University of Reading in April 2014, funded by the
Economic and Social Research Centre (ESRC, UK), with the support of the
Centre de Recherches Historiques at the cole des Hautes tudes en Sciences
Sociales (CRH-EHESS).8 A total of nine experts on six Old Regime Eu-
ropean polities (France, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Dutch Provinces,
the Kingdom of Naples and Sweden) debated the theme ‘The Excesses of
7. M. DINCECCO, 2013.
8. I thank both these institutions for their ýnancial help. Support from The Economic and
Social Research Council is part of a 3-year professorial fellowship (ES/K010654).
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the State: administrative control or political transparency in seventeenth to
nineteenth century Europe?’ The result is a fascinating voyage through time
and space which explores the issues of control and communication in vari-
ous early-modern European polities. The purpose of this introduction is not
to summarize the content of each contribution — as they speak for them-
selves — but to open a brief discussion on the terminology and the method-
ology deployed, as well as to propose some historical reþection about ýscal
control and accountability before the events in France in 1789.
1. A question of vocabulary
Transparency is a catch-all-phrase that has spread like wildýre in the
past two decades. As a substantive, it describes a moral value — like happi-
ness — which seems highly desirable, in contrast to opacity or secrecy. In
this respect, transparency can be considered a political principle and, even,
a natural human right.9Although the word transparency was not to be found
in the vocabulary of moral and political philosophy prior to 1789, the very
idea pervaded early-modern society, alongside the development of the state
itself, in particular the power to levy tax. At the height of a major ýnancial
crisis in France which brought about the collapse of the Absolute monar-
chy, the principle of ýscal accountability took its place in the Declaration
of the rights of the man and the citizen of 1789. Article 14 empowered the
newly-created citizen to ‘decide either personally or by their representative,
as to the necessity of the public contribution; to grant this freely; to know to
what uses it is put; and to ýx the proportion, the mode of assessment and of
collection and the duration of the taxes’.
Article 15 added that ‘Society has the right to require of every public
agent an account of his administration’. While discussion of these penulti-
mate articles in the French National Assembly in the summer of 1789 was
relatively short, reports at the time indicate that deputies disagreed about the
need to include them in the famous declaration. Several deputies believed
that these articles were not rights per se but constitutional prescriptions not
worthy of inclusion in a universal statement of the very principles of natural
law. In other words, the principles (political philosophy) and the practic-
es (institutions) could be separated, and their relationship determined by
policy (the rule of law). In practice, the declaration of rights became the
yardstick against which citizens measured the efýciency of revolutionary
institutions and compliance with its principles. Adoption by radical groups,
9. P. BIRKINSHAW, 2006.
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like the Jacobins Clubs and Sans-Culottes movements, of the symbolic ýg-
ure of an eye radiating rays of light exempliýes the potential gap between
principle and practice.
As we will see below, it is important to recognise these distinctions to
avoid confusion when using concepts such as representation, accountability,
publicity, control, transparency, and also for analysing their discursive rela-
tionship with antonyms like secrecy, opacity, mystery. This can be exempli-
ýed by the exchanges between the Parlement of Paris and the French king.
In the numerous ýscal remonstrances they addressed to Louis XV during
the dramatic Seven Years War (1756-1763), the Parisian magistrates drew
upon the judicial vocabulary of the time to articulate requests for the gov-
ernment to justify the necessity and destination of new revenue.10Of course,
it is questionable whether the introduction of formal procedures to legiti-
mate ýscal policy without openly challenging royal authority was workable
within absolute monarchies. On the other hand, it may seem simplistic to
assume that a change of paradigm as radical as the French Revolution could
be spontaneous and its principles abolish societal tensions arising from the
administration of human affairs.
Well into the nineteenth century, these questions still remained un-
resolved and they continued to preoccupy many, like the marquis d’Audif-
fret (1787-1878) in his brochure On Public Accountability and the Court of
Accounts of France (1850). Interestingly, the father of modern public ac-
counting in France never used the word ‘transparency’ in his works. He still
referred to the vocabulary of the Enlightenment and its concept of light.
In the same way as Louis Brandeis, later, famously wrote about America
that ‘sunlight is said to be the best disinfectant’, d’Audiffret considered the
concept of ‘light’ as one of the cornerstones of social harmony and political
freedom. ‘Order and light’, he wrote, ‘are the primary laws of that eter-
nal harmony which we admire in Divine creation… Political systems in
the present day have to accomplish that twofold condition required by the
times, which brings the prerogative of sovereign power into harmony with
the guarantees of rational freedom. These are the main pillars of every state
which is established on the basis of national representation’.11
10. J. SWANN & J. FÉLIX, 2008.
11. G. D’AUDIFFRET, 1850, p. 7. This is a translation of De la Comptabilité publique et de la
Cour des Comptes, Paris, 1847, which was ýrst published in volume VII of the Encyclopédie du
droit, thus under the regime of the constitutional monarchy introduced by the Charter of 1814 and
reformed in 1830. The book was translated into English in 1850, after the Revolution of 1848 which
saw the establishment of the Second Republic.
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Half a century after the fall of the Bastille, the problem for d’Audif-
fret (he started his career as a civil servant under the Bourbon Restoration
and became président de la Cour des Comptes) was not to make a plea in
favour of individual and political rights. They were de facto granted by the
Charter of the Constitutional monarchy (1814), although with qualiýcations.
His main purpose was to ensure that the modern world could deliver on its
promises, in particular by introducing a technique capable of implementing
accountability. D’Audiffret argued that what he called ‘public accountabil-
ity’ should be envisaged as ‘a method and an analytical arrangement’ to
throw light on ýscal and political systems, and claimed that this concept,
envisaged as a tool for good governance, was ‘novel in our own country, and
till now almost unknown in Europe’.12 Indeed, when d’Audiffret published
the ýrst edition of his book, the model of absolute monarchies dominated in
continental Europe and accountability in newly-established parliamentary
regimes remained problematic.
2. Modelling transparency
The distinction between principle and practice is a central argument of
the important volume co-ordinated by Christopher Hood and David Heald
entitled Transparency: the key to better governance? As the question mark
indicates, both authors manifest a cautious attitude towards the usage, and
potential misuse, in contemporary parlance of the concept of transparency,
which they consider an all-purpose tool. Their main objective was to ra-
tionalise the meaning of a word which, in the context of the forthcoming
implementation of the Freedom of Information Act (2000), had attained,
according to Hood, ‘quasi-religious signiýcance in debate over governance
and institutional design’ in the United Kingdom. One will note the religious
analogy used both by Hood and d’Audiffret. Not unlike the latter, Heald
also proposed to distinguish between transparency considered intrinsically,
as a core concept, and instrumentally, as a building block or a technique,
among others, that can be harnessed to generate trust between government
and society.
With this distinction in mind, Heald has mobilised the theory of pub-
lic choice to reýne the concept of transparency. He has proposed a useful
analytical model that identiýes four varieties of transparency, or types of
dynamic relationships between societal actors. They can be grouped in two
pairs. The ýrst pair of actors are organised in a vertical relationship where
12. G. D’AUDIFFRET, 1850, p. 8.
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transparency can be either upwards (i.e., a population, as the principal,
looking up at the activity of an agent) or downwards (for instance, when
government seek to acquire knowledge about what is happening below).
The second pair of actors is organised in a horizontal relationship where
transparency can be inwards (i.e., the opportunity for outsiders to look at
the activities of an organisation) or outwards (i.e., a subordinate or agent can
observe what is happening outside the organisation). Finally, Heald’s model
introduces a crucial element — timing — which adds another important
distinction in the forms of transparency or accountability, depending on
whether information is disclosed in real time or in retrospect.13
The historian can certainly apply this model to ascertain what type of
transparency — or accountability — is at stake when examining issues of
administrative control and communication in early-modern polities. Daniel
Baugh’s article on the question of the discrepancies between effective naval
expenditure and Parliament’s votes, or Mathieu Marraud’s analysis of the
Parisian guilds’ debt and scrutiny of their ýnances by royal commission-
ers illustrates the broad question of who was accountable to whom. Patrik
Winton’s study of the relationship between the subsidies paid by France to
Sweden, the social structure of politics in Sweden and the monetary poli-
cy of the Bank of Sweden suggests that systemic change implied making
a political choice between secrecy and market economy. Anne Murphy’s
study of the internal audit conducted by the Bank of England, which co-
incided with the movement for ‘Economical Reform’, also indicates that
ýnancial systems, if they were to function efýciently, relied on agencies
adopting similar attitude towards publicity and accountability. Altogether,
these contributions reveal that although one can identify various forms of
accountability, they were part and parcel of the broader questions of control,
publicity and communication within speciýc polities.
3. The politics of communication
Drawing a distinction between transparency as a right and an instru-
ment makes it possible to separate the political dimension of accountability,
which is rooted in the philosophy of natural rights, and tools for account-
ability which may have existed in various forms at different times in the
early-modern era. In this respect, transparency can be studied as a historical
object which transcends the traditional divide between periods and poli-
ties. Indeed, as Feenstra’s and Loiseau’s contributions respectively on the
13. D. HEALD, 2006.
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province of Groenigen in the Dutch provinces and the French provincial
estates remind us, absolute and limited polities were often composite and
decentralised states before 1789. Contrasting principle and practice also ýts
well with recent developments in the history of intellectual ideas. In his
work on the Enlightenment, Jonathan Israel has demonstrated the existence
of a radical strand within the Enlightenment.14 Inevitably, this has raised
renewed interest in the more moderate philosophers, the likes of Voltaire for
instance, and the policies conducted by familiar ýgures such as Frederick
the Great, Gustav III, or Joseph II, usually associated with domestic reform
and enlightened despotism. The distinction between accountability in prin-
ciple and in practice makes even greater sense in the context of revisionist
approaches to the concept of absolutism, which a majority of historians re-
ject as not applicable in practice once policies are properly investigated.15
In trying to identify the historical origins of contemporary transpar-
ency, Christopher Hood reminds us that publishing information — and one
could add the potential for endogenous developments — can be situated in
the traditional doctrine that government should operate according to ýxed
and predictable rules. Fiscal historians have long mentioned the importance
of sir George Downing’s introduction of the payment ‘in course’ in the late
seventeenth century, whereby the state’s expenditures were disbursed ac-
cording to a clear calendar. By contrast, at the same time France used to
pay its expenditure through assignations on its ýscal agents, a costly system
prone to undue delays, favouritism, and distrust and, in the end, default. C.
Hood adds that if traditional forms of publicity are usually associated with
representative regimes, they can also be found in less liberal regimes, as
part of a broader logic of organisational and political power within the exec-
utive government. With its reliance on patronage to promote his policy and
use of his network of clients to gather vital information, Colbert is certainly
the archetype of the minister capable of playing the rules of the game and
managing the system, within its limits, to its best.16
A century later, in another context, the political works of Count Fried-
rich von Hertzberg (1725-1795), who was one of Frederick II’s principal ad-
visers, shows the extent to which issues of publicity mattered in absolute re-
gimes. In his annual address to the Berlin Academy to celebrate his master’s
birthday (26 January), Hertzberg always included a Table of the great sums
14. J. ISRAEL, 2008.
15. N. HENSHALL, 1992.




that His Majesty has distributed freely during the course of this year… for
the advancement of agriculture and manufactures, and in general for the
well-being of his subjects. Interestingly enough, Hertzberg felt compelled to
justify such disclosure of the arcana imperii. He confessed: ‘I do not think
I am causing any harm to the State, nor betraying its secrets, by publishing
facts notorious at home, and by making better known its goodness, strength,
and vigour. It is more and more admitted that great policy does not consist
in the mystery with which government covered itself, but that those who act
openly, with publicity and frankness, win a lot more the conýdence of its
subjects and neighbours’.17
Of course, publicity of this kind can be misleading. It falls into a
category that has been labelled ‘policy of admiration’ and considered typi-
cal of the ceremonies of communication orchestrated by governments in ab-
solute regimes, by contrast to the more effective publicity and accountabili-
ty of limited monarchies.18 Such contrasts are exempliýed in Rafael Torres
Sánchez’s analysis of king Carlos III’s paternalistic discourse to justify the
need to levy new taxes to fund the American War, a communication strat-
egy which was nulliýed by the inability of the Spanish administration to
actually monitor the sums outstanding in the hands of local tax receivers. In
the case of France, a similar tension arose when Jacques Necker published
his famous Compte rendu au roi (1781), arguably a public justiýcation of the
need to levy taxes to service loans, while Louis XVI’s paternalist ýscal dis-
course alluded to the rise of taxation on social grounds and fear of political
opposition from the elites.19
Like many administrators in the aftermath of Montesquieu’s inþuen-
tial Spirit of the Laws (1748), one of Hertzberg’s avowed aims was also to
contribute to the wider debate about the relative and respective strengths,
characteristics and beneýts of European polities. For Hertzberg argued that
ofýcial publications of Frederic II’s use of monies gave ‘new proofs that
a monarchical government is and can be excellent, and can make for the
public good arrangements which are far superior to those entailed in the na-
ture of republican governments’. Curiously, Hertzberg’s ideas on publicising
government policy did not lead him to support the introduction of a modern
political order in Prussia, which he considered not workable in the sort of
monarchy he had in mind. In his view, publicity was essentially a superi-
or technique of government. In his condemnation of ‘absolute secrecy’, he
17. F. VON HERTZBERG, 1786, p. 72.
18. M. FOGEL, 1989.
19. J. FÉLIX, 2013.
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attacked less a principle than the consequences of an ill-conceived method
of administration which had the potential for introducing new laws based
on uncertain or dubious grounds.20 A similar argument was used by French
reformers in the early eighteenth century who called on the king’s ýnance
ministers to stop adopting secret advice and harmful projects submitted by
interested parties. Instead, they asked for the establishment of new insti-
tutions to scrutinize manuscript memoirs relating to matters of the state’s
administration by the means of publication. In this model, the ultimate de-
cision on the memoranda would belong to speciýc institutions, which would
advise the minister, or would be simply left to public opinion via the me-
chanics of the public sphere.
The problem with Hertzberg’s views is that communication between
the king and the public was deemed useful as long as it could generate
conýdence and make the sovereign’s decisions legitimate. For this reason,
he considered the publication of Necker’s Compte rendu, the ýrst ofýcial
publication in real time of France’s ýnancial situation, the most important
service a minister had rendered to the nation and the king. The fact remains
that in Hertzberg’s mind the direction of publicity was unilateral and, as a
result, opposition both impossible and unthinkable. Nonetheless, he consid-
ered that a variety of channels facilitated exchange between the king and his
subjects, and varied according to the nature of the polity. He believed the
King’s speech at the opening of the Parliamentary session was one of the
great strengths of the English constitution. In other polities, communication
existed too but in the form of royal declarations and edicts, or harangues
and discussions in assemblies of royal councils or national assemblies.
4. Knowledge and information
When it comes to ýscal issues, which were, with religion, a central
source of contention in the early-modern period, assessing the level of ac-
tual and effective accountability among the various European polities is
not a straightforward exercise. At this point, it is important to observe that
for a long period of time access to a coherent body of knowledge about
state ýnances was simply impossible for the multitude. The ýrst ýnancial
histories which were meant for the instruction of the public appeared only
in the 1750s, with the respective work of Postlethwayth in England and For-
bonnais in France.21 This does not mean that information on this important
20. F. VON HERTZBERG, 1786, p. 61.
21. POSTLETHWAYT, 1759; F. FORBONNAIS, 1758; J. HOPPIT, 2002; J. FÉLIX, 1999.
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issue was absolutely existent. In the tradition of William Petty’s political
arithmetic, Charles Davenant published macro-economic data about the
revenue, wealth and population of England, the Netherlands and France in
the late seventeenth century.22 In 1715, French ýnance minister Desma-
retz published a very detailed account of his ýscal policy under the late
Louis XIV and in 1720, as John Law’s system was starting to fall part,
the government made public an account of the state of the debts and their
progressive reduction under the Regency.23
True, unlike in Britain, public disclosure in France of ýscal documents
was the exception rather than the norm. Yet, catalogues of national libraries
and special collections reveal that French ýscal documents were printed
from time to time, and sometimes leaked by the government, probably with
political intent. For instance, a relatively accurate French budget was pub-
lished in the Netherlands in 1749 and an account from ýnance minister
Terray to Louis XVI in 1774 was immediately published, although not with
the ýscal administration blueprint.24 It seems, however, that such in-roads
in the secrecy of ýscal matters were opportunist responses to circumstances
rather than a proper reþexion on the role of publicity and a real commitment
to introduce it within royal institutions. In 1787, at the height of a major
ýscal and political crisis, and six years after Necker’s ofýcial publication,
discussion within the Royal Council opposed ministers on the necessity
of disclosing ýnancial accounts and debated whether accounts ought to be
made public every three or ýve years.
The increase in the volume of, and access to, information profoundly
transformed the environment in which government traditionally operated
across Europe. From the 1740s onwards, most countries experienced a sud-
den and signiýcant surge in the number of books and printed material. In
Germany, for instance, between 1764 and 1800, the number of new books
published annually tripled and the number of newspapers grew from 411
in the 1750s to 1,225 in the 1780s. As in France, the audience for these
publications grew thanks to the growth of literacy and readership increased
through masonic lodges and political clubs, scientiýc institutions and read-
ing societies. Given its economic impact, the vitality of the book trade was
a real challenge to pre-publication censorship which was either abolished,
22. C. DAVENANT, 1695; his ýgures were reproduced and discussed by F. VÉRON DE FORBON-
NAIS, 1758.
23. N. DESMARETZ, n.p., n.d.
24. J.-M. TERRAY, n.p., n.d [1775]; J. FÉLIX, 2013.
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as in Denmark under Struensee (1770), or considerably relaxed, as was the
case in France, although with bouts of repression.
Even in Britain, where the king’s subjects traditionally enjoyed free-
dom of the press, a right conýrmed in the Bill of Rights (1689), the increase
in the volume of information, also noticeable in the eighteenth century, was
a cause for some concern. In the 1730s and 1740s, ministers were concer-
ned by the reporting — or rather the misreporting with political intent —
of speeches in the Commons which, at the time, were not available to the
wider public. In 1742, a publication venture offered to publish the speeches
of the Commons from Queen Anne’s accession in the form of books, and
not magazines, and also promised to bring them up to the present. The prin-
ter ended up in prison while a variety of measures were taken to limit free-
dom of the press on reporting parliamentary speeches. It must be said that
repression found little political support and was loosely implemented.25 In
the mid-1750s, Edmund Burke’s take-over of the Annual Register certainly
ýlled a vacuum and responded to a public demand for news and information
which, in Britain as in France, was traditionally accessible only to a relati-
vely small elite.
As Hertzberg rightly pointed out, declarations and edicts were the
traditional method for governments to disclose information to the public.
According to the famous German geographer Gottfried Achenwall, Britain
and France stood out in Europe in terms of the amount of ýscal information
they made available by such means. The true problem, observed Achenwall,
was the sheer difýculty of making sense of the existing information. Indeed,
to meet its objectives, ýscal publicity had to present information or data
in a credible and convenient way that fostered inferability.26 In the same
way as recent debates have queried the readability of the balance sheets
of contemporary central banks, the information disclosed in the eighteenth
century was not always easy to interpret. For instance, in Burke’s issues of
the Annual Register, Parliamentary budgetary decisions (ways and means)
are reported as a list of ýgures. Since volumes appeared only once a year,
publicity was in retrospect, particularly during the Seven Years War when
the publication of annual issues was systematically delayed. In effect, it
would take almost another half-century, up until 1802, before the Treasury
submitted a full and legible budget to the House of Commons.
25. J. BLACK, 1987.
26. G.MICHENER & K. BERSCH, 2013.
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The case of France was different but not dissimilar. Here too ýscal
information was available. Decisions on ýscal and credit policy were ofý-
cially published in royal edicts which were registered by courts of justice.
In 1768, the ýnance minister L’Averdy warned Louis XV that the public
had learnt to count so well that it predicted default as inevitable.27 But in-
formation remained so unprecise that experts called upon by government
for their advice on ýscal strategy could not rely on accurate data to defend
their views or, worse, proposed policies were simply not viable once ýgures
were added. As a matter of fact, published information was not easy to un-
derstand either. It was certainly impenetrable to potential foreign investors
in the French funds who could not read the language. With this in mind,
Achenwall set himself the task of writing for his German compatriots a
commentary of abbé Terray’s edict of November 1771, an ofýcial document
in which the contrôleur général clariýed the situation of French ýnances
after his famous 1770’s default. Making sense of the state of French ýnanc-
es, as set out at length in the edict, was truly impossible as only specialists
could decipher its technical vocabulary. Incidentally, this is an indication
that Terray’s purpose was to establish a line of communication with profes-
sional ýnanciers and not trying to appeal to a wider audience of investors.
In any case, the relatively clear articles of the volumes of the Encyclopédie
méthodique speciýcally devoted to ýnances only appeared in 1783.28 In
the meantime, the average German reader would ýnd no help in current
language dictionaries which offered neither translation nor explanation of
ýnancial vocabulary. Achenwall argued, however, that once the meaning
of the vocabulary was clariýed the edict gave a fairly good idea about the
actual resources of France.29
Recent analyses of transparency which draw upon theories of com-
munication emphasize the need to go beyond the question of the quality of
the information disclosed to examine publicity in relation to the strategies
of the provider, the recipient’s reactions and the role of the media.30 One
of the problems with Necker’s publication on the state of French ýnance in
1781 was certainly the scarcity of ýscal data. This made his ýscal policy
and his Compte rendu the subject of vicious attacks about his abilities and
hidden agenda. As his successor and arch-enemy Calonne realised when he
attacked Necker’s ýgures in an opening speech to the Assembly of Nota-
bles (1787), disagreement over ýgures could not properly be addressed and
27. J. FÉLIX, 1999.
28. J.-P. ROUSSELOT DE SURGY, 1783-1784.
29. G.ACHENWALL, 1774.
30. M. FENSTER, 2015.
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reputation ascertained without disclosing more information in the public
sphere.31 This suggests — as Necker argued in 1781 — that once forms of
publicity are part of government policy on communication with the public,
there is no easy way-out. To an extent, this explains why the history of trans-
parency is not a linear one.
5. Public credit
On both sides of the Channel, the development of public credit was
one key factor in promoting ýscal publicity. Regular quotation of British
funds in the press went hand in hand with the rapid development of the
ýnancial market from the Glorious Revolution onwards. Although France
also had an early ýnancial market, no documents have survived to prove or
disprove existence of regular and accessible quotation of state bonds and
other assets circulated by ýnanciers. It seems that quotation of ýnancial
assets was the preserve of agents de change and merchants until the 1740s
when they made their appearance in newspapers. By that time, the state
of semi-permanent warfare between France and Britain had resumed and
was a cause of considerable stress in both monarchies. David Hume per-
haps best qualiýed the fundamental tension when he warned that ‘either the
nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the nation’.
Although history proved Hume wrong, debt remained a central issue for
the major powers, a concern which was soon to be shared by all European
powers as loans, paper-money and other credit facilities were relentlessly
issued to pay for the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars.
To sustain conýdence, sovereigns were compelled to reassure cred-
itors and attract potential investors. A variety of ýscal techniques or in-
stitutions could be used to maintain the public appetite for investment in
the state funds. The creation of the Sinking fund in England and Caisse
d’amortissement in France was meant to provide a sound basis for servic-
ing the interest and redeeming the capital on bonds. These new establish-
ments were aimed at maximum publicity. In France, each year a public
ceremony would take place in Paris during which, like the drawing of the
lottery today, royal bonds to be refunded were drawn from a revolving
drum. The activities of the Caisse d’amortissement were advertised and
details about its resources, payments to be made and outstanding capital
publicised in ofýcial documents.
31. Between 1787 and 1789 Calonne and Necker attacked each other in a series of publica-
tions where they discussed at length data and policy.
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In addition to these institutional developments, civil society contri-
buted to a number of publications which increased public awareness. One
can hardly avoid mention of the development of statistics, which can be
traced back to the late seventeenth century. They were associated with the
state’s desire to acquire tools for governing, as is evidenced in the case of
German Cameralism. As Loiseau’s and Marraud’s paper show, debt policy
and the development of public credit in France ran hand-in-hand with the
introduction of new administrative documents to scrutinize the ýnances of
corporate bodies which lend their credit to the king. New administrative
documents were meant to monitor ýscal revenue more accurately, plan debt
policy and assist discussion between Versailles and the provincial estates
about the feasibility of the latter raising taxes or issuing new loans on behalf
of the king.
There also existed outside of the state apparatus a market for private
consumption of ýscal information. A variety of publishing initiatives ap-
peared in response to questions about the resources and relative strengths
of states. From the 1760s, the German geographer Anton Bsching started
gathering data about populations, size of the armies and navies, and revenue
of European states, which he published and revised in successive editions of
his Magazin. The scientiýc revolution assisted the invention of non-verbal
ways for communicating and comparing quantitative data. Between 1786
and 1789, French ministers started assembling large tables with data that
provided a detailed and synoptic view of the French population, the king’s
expenditure and revenue, colonial trade, etc. In 1789, the deputies of the
French assembled to deal with the deýcit and the debt were given the oppor-
tunity to access a large table containing data about twenty-three European
states.32 At the same time, William Playfair, the inventor of graphs, starting
using new methods to represent and compare the relative ýscal power of
European polities. All of these authors vied with each other in their deter-
mination to publish accurate and up-to-date information. Like Achenwall in
the 1760s, Playfair travelled Europe and relied on patronage and networks
in the Republic of Letters to access ofýcial documents normally kept secret
by government.33 Inevitably, as D. Cicolella’s article suggest, such contacts
allowed exchanges and transfers, making publicity and accountability pos-
sible, as well as creating a demand for information and transparency.
32. British Library, Additionnai Manuscripts 74100, Aperçu de la Balance du Commerce de
la France, Année 1789. Ensemble le relevé de la Population, des Finances et Forces Militaires
des Principales Puissances de l’Europe. See also J. FÉLIX, 2011, and an on-line publication of this
document http://www.reading.ac.uk/history/about/staff/Historical_Finance_Fiscal_History.aspx
33. W. PLAYFAIR, 2005.
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6. Stages in publicity
If publicity and accountability have a history, it is a staggered onewhich
does not really comply with a linear model of development. For instance,
the famous Swedish Freedom of Information Act of 1766 was soon the vic-
tim of Gustav III’s coup against the Diet (1772), and was only re-introduced
in 1809. The history of ýscal publicity is full of paradoxes. Publication by
the Imprimerie Royale of Jacques Necker’s Compte rendu, which became,
with his Treatise on the Administration of Finances (1783), the Europe-
an best-seller of the last decades of the Old Regime, backýred. The Swiss
banker who had been appointed ýnance minister of the Bourbon monarchy
was accused of massaging the ýgures and misleading the public. Critics
inevitably queried the rationale behind the king’s benevolence and the ca-
pability of ýscal administration to provide accurate ýgures. In other words,
if publicity was meant to assist government policy, it had also the poten-
tial to create problems. The intense political debate that the publication of
Necker’s Compte rendu generated in France, and in Europe more broadly,
highlights the public’s appetite for information about ýnances and their po-
litical impact. It also indicates that one key problem for government was not
to accept only publicity as a principle but to learn how to anticipate and react
to the ways in which the public would receive, interpret and comment upon
information, especially in the absence of institutions authorised to represent
the public voice and effectively limit executive power. This question is per-
haps best expressed by Calonne’s powerlessness when he faced resistance
from the Assembly of Notables he had convened to obtain support for his
tax policy and replied: ‘The power to vote tax is not the power to refuse it’.
The road to ýscal transparency in Europe was a long journey because
the various polities that made the early modern society were unequally
equipped to respond to ýscal crises — that periodically led to questioning
of the very fabric of society. Wars, with their impact on the distribution of
wealth and the routes they opened for personal enrichment, inevitably led to
demands from society on their government. In Britain, such demands were
usually met — and defused — by the creation of a Parliamentary Com-
mission entitled to look into Public Accounts.34 In France, up until 1715,
monarchs used to set up royal commissions in the form of chambres de
justice to investigate the fortune of ýnanciers and issue ýnes that were nev-
er paid.35 Overall, peace was the most efýcient tool to balance budgets and
avoid popular demands for accountability and punishment. In the context of
34. J. HOPPIT, 2002.
35. D. DESSERT, 1984; J. F. BOSHER, 1973.
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renewed warfare which raised deep concerns about political stability and
ýnancial proýt, the traditional elites saw the foundations of their domination
challenged by the philosophy of the Enlightenment and the constitution of
a critical public sphere which did not ýt well with traditional channels of
communication and legitimation. Powers of second rank were not immune
but were partly protected as they were not involved in the American War of
Independence which was a major burden on the two main competitors, in
particular France, a country which was making quick progress on the road
to publicity. The Revolution, however, suddenly opened a new chapter in
the history of accountability as it became a principle which had to be im-
plemented in practice. Although the French Revolution’s impact on Europe
was arguably considerable, it would take time and more crises before ýscal
publicity and political accountability would make their contribution to a
faire society.
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